"Woraphat" points out that the global economy is at risk of being slowly squeezed by high energy prices, even though Hormuz (the cycle of hormones) is not completely closed.
Worapak pointed out that the worrying situation may not be a complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but rather the fact that the waterway remains open but with continuously increasing costs and risks, which will gradually put pressure on the global economy.
Date 8 March 2569 at 10.18:XNUMX p.m. Mr. Worapak Thanyawong, former Deputy Minister of Finance. Posted on personal Facebook that The most worrying scenario may not be a complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz, because in that case, the market would react strongly but more quickly, with stock liquidation, military intervention, and diplomatic pressure. What's more frightening is a "stalling" situation where ships can still pass through, but at a more expensive, slower, and riskier pace each week. Because this situation will gradually erode the global economy, leading to stubborn inflation, slower interest rate cuts, and a gradual decline in business confidence without a clear breaking point.
The Strait of Hormuz is also a truly strategic point for the global energy market. In 2567, an average of around 20 million barrels of oil per day flowed through it, or about 20% of global oil consumption. It is also the transit route for roughly one-fifth of the world's LNG. Importantly, while alternative routes to bypass the strait exist, they are limited. The EIA estimates that the pipeline capacity of Saudi Arabia and the UAE that could potentially bypass Hormuz is only partially sufficient, thus mitigating the situation but not completely replacing the existing supply.
Under this assumption, oil prices are more likely to remain above their base rather than experiencing a sudden surge. In market terms, Brent could average 10–25% above the normal scenario over several quarters, rather than immediately jumping to the crisis levels of the 1970s. The reasons are disruptions to shipping, higher shipping insurance costs, rerouting, and temporary export halts, which will increase energy costs even if supply doesn't disappear completely. Reuters has already reported that in the first week of the conflict, some producers began reducing production or managing output due to export restrictions and inventory limitations.
The impact on the global economy will come in the form of a “visible tax” rather than a sudden collapse. The IMF states that if energy prices rise by 10% and remain at that level for a year, it will push global inflation up by about 0.4 percentage points and suppress growth by about 0.1–0.2 percentage points. This may not sound like much, but in an already slow-growing world, these figures are enough to make many countries that were already “weak” become “vulnerable,” especially net energy importers and those with high debt.
Therefore, what the major central banks will face is a dirty and very unpleasant trade-off: an economy slowing down, but inflation headlines bouncing back from energy. This means that the Fed, ECB, and BoE are less likely to rush into cutting interest rates as the market had hoped, rather than resume a round of rate hikes. As a result, short-term interest rates are falling slower than expected, while the long-term is under pressure from a risk premium, inflation is only slightly increasing, and the yield curve may steepen gradually.
The structural losers in this situation are quite clear. First, there's Europe, as it remains a net energy importer and many industries are sensitive to gas and electricity. Second, there's Asia, a major energy importer, particularly countries heavily reliant on Middle Eastern oil and LNG. Reuters reports that Asia imports around 60% of its total crude oil needs from the Middle East, and the EIA indicates that 84% of crude/condensate and 83% of LNG passing through Hormuz in 2024 are primarily destined for Asia. Therefore, it's not surprising that Asia would be the region bearing the brunt of any prolonged disruptions to this route.
Conversely, the winners will be concentrated in producing countries outside the geopolitical risk zone, such as the United States, Canada, Brazil, Norway, and parts of Africa, because they can sell at higher prices without bearing the same geopolitical discount as the Persian Gulf producers. The United States itself is far less directly dependent on Hormuz, as in 2024 it imported only about 0.5 million barrels per day via this route, representing 7% of US crude oil imports and only 2% of domestic liquid oil consumption.
Zooming in on Thailand, the picture becomes even more worrying than that of some larger economies because Thailand is a net energy importer and remains heavily dependent on the Middle East. S&P Global reports that by 2025, Thailand will import approximately 491,500 barrels of crude oil and condensate per day from the Middle East, and by 2026, this region will account for over 51% of total imports. Meanwhile, Thai media cite analyses suggesting that Thailand's net energy imports in 2025 will be around 6% of GDP, which is high for Asia.
Thailand's risks are not limited to gasoline; they extend to electricity as well. Because Thailand's energy system remains heavily reliant on natural gas, the latest industry data indicates that approximately 58% of electricity used in Thailand still comes from natural gas. Argus also points out that Thailand has ongoing long-term LNG contracts with expected delivery volumes of around 8.3 million tons in 2026 and 9.1 million tons in 2027. This means that volatility in LNG supply at Hormuz, or higher spot prices, will gradually seep into domestic electricity and production costs.
On a macroeconomic level, Thailand will face four layers of impact simultaneously. The first factor is a resurgence of inflation driven by energy costs. Fuel, electricity, and transportation costs are all affected. Although the Bank of Thailand (BOT) previously projected low inflation in 2026 due to a weak global oil base, it has clearly stated that geopolitical tensions driving up global oil prices are a significant upside risk to inflation.
The second factor is that GDP growth has slowed down. Because household income is being eroded by the cost of living, business costs are rising, and the manufacturing and transportation sectors are being squeezed, with policy signals from the Bank of Thailand (BOT) that Thai media cites as an average increase of $10 per barrel in oil prices throughout the year potentially pushing Thailand's GDP down by around 0.1–0.15% and pushing inflation up by around 0.4–0.5 percentage points, if the war drags on for 6–12 months, the cumulative impact may not be a recession, but enough to further weaken an already fragile recovery.
The third level is the current account balance and the value of the Thai baht. Thailand is importing more energy at higher prices, risking a worsening energy trade balance. Furthermore, if global market sentiment shifts into a risk-off mode, the baht tends to weaken against the dollar. This weakening would further exacerbate imported inflation, particularly in energy and imported raw materials. Although the Bank of Thailand has not yet released specific estimates for a prolonged war scenario, the IMF has emphasized that the impact will depend on the “size and duration” of the conflict, which aligns with Thailand's higher vulnerability compared to many other countries in the region.
The fourth layer is policy constraints. Thailand faces a classic dilemma as an energy importing country: if prices are allowed to reflect true costs, inflation will rise rapidly and affect consumers. However, if the government provides excessive subsidies, it will pressure the fiscal position and delay energy adjustments. This is why the Thai government, in the early stages of the crisis, quickly sought to diversify import sources and even suspend the export of some oil products to mitigate domestic supply risks.
At the business level, the victims in Thailand will be very clear. The first group is airlines, tourism, and logistics, because jet fuel and diesel are major costs. The second group is petrochemicals, chemicals, packaging, cement, paper, and energy-intensive manufacturers, because feedstock costs and electricity prices have increased along with weakening global demand. The third group is domestic consumers and middle-to-lower income retailers, because their real income is squeezed by the cost of living. Research by McKinsey and ING consistently indicates that the air transport industry and energy-intensive businesses are among the first to have their margins eroded when the energy shock is prolonged.
The beneficiaries in Thailand are fewer, but not nonexistent. The first group consists of some upstream and midstream energy producers and traders who experience inventory gains and improved margins during certain periods. The second group includes renewable energy and efficiency businesses such as solar rooftops, storage, and energy management. This is because whenever fossil fuel prices are persistently high, energy saving projects have shorter payback periods and are easier to invest in. This is the structural reason why oil price shocks often accelerate the energy transition rather than halt it.
From an investor's perspective, the overall global scenario is inflation sticky, growth softer, and cuts slower. For Thailand, the picture is higher energy costs, a slower recovery, and some inflation returning, but it's not healthy inflation because it stems from costs, not demand. This means the Thai stock market, in this scenario, tends to lag behind sectors heavily reliant on consumption and high energy consumption, but may find its footing in energy, some utility sectors, and businesses with high pricing power.
My view is that if the war drags on for 6-12 months without a winner, the world won't face an economic "Armageddon," but rather something far more troublesome: low economic growth, higher-than-expected inflation, and monetary policy stagnation. Thailand will be one of the Asian countries that bears a significant shock because of its heavy reliance on imported energy and high gas consumption in its electricity system. To put it simply, I think this isn't a complete shock, but rather a slow squeeze that's impacting the entire world, and is squeezing Thailand more sharply than many initially estimated.
Source:Facebook Vorapak Tanyawong
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